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THE GREAT TACTICIAN: 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, OBAMACARE, AND 
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF PARTISAN 
POLITICS 
KATHERINE H. BLANKENSHIP* 
It is a long accepted and relied upon fiction that for every legal case 
and controversy there is but one correct answer.1  Through this fiction is 
born a belief that there are clear and objective right and wrong answers to 
every issue.2  This dichotomy of correctness creates a divide between two 
canons of thought, which in turn creates the split down the aisle that keeps 
the branches of our government enmeshed in partisan politics.3 
This partisanship not only runs through the political branches but 
also inevitably resides in the judiciary.4  The judiciary has long relied on a 
belief in one correct answer and traditionally, reaching the correct answer 
was achieved through a formalistic, restrained, and objective application of 
the law.5  Yet, this approach denied the inevitable truth expressed by Justice 
                                                 
 *   J.D., magna cum laude, Belmont University College of Law, 2014.  I would like 
to thank the entire Belmont Law Review staff, especially my editing team, Sara Page, Alex 
Davenport, Addie Wilson, and Christine Davis, the Belmont College of Law founding Law 
Review members of 2014, Professor Jeffrey Usman, and my family, especially John Judkins, 
Pat Blankenship, and John Blankenship for their love, support and patient proofreading. 
 1. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and The 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1949) 
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Remarks] (arguing that the Court uses a conventional vocabulary that 
continues to unfortunately presuppose there is only one correct answer and so then there are 
two opposing canons on every part). 
 2. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401. 
 3. See id. at 401 (noting that because the court relies on a conventional and static 
lexicon, and by presupposing there is one correct answer, it binds itself to the perpetuation of 
a system with “two opposing canons on almost every point”); see generally Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 HAR. L. REV. 1286, 1296 
(1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences] (explaining that “[i]f you pose 
this question in the world of correct or incorrect doctrine, you enter on a never ending 
battle.”). 
 4. See generally Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296 
(suggesting that the line between judges finding law and making law is ultimately 
meaningless because “the judges in fact do both at once”). 
 5. See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (1934) 
(explaining that traditional judicial philosophy based on formalism and restraint grounds 
decisions in the mechanical and technical application of the law due to a belief that such 
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Holmes that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”6  By consistently relying on a dichotomy of correctness, the 
judiciary ignores the inevitable subjectivity embedded in the role of the 
judge and promulgates the false misconception that for every legal question 
there is one correct answer.7 
The judge is not a beacon of objectivity, sitting on high, removed 
from the trials and tribulations of the human experience.8  She is just as 
enmeshed in the values, desires, disappointments, and the various other 
ingredients that are the stuff of human life as everyone else.9  To deny that 
such experience is removed from the judge the moment she sits on the 
bench is a mistake.10  Her decision is filtered through the lens of her 
experience and that experience creates only the absolute, true, correct 
answer for her.11  Even adopting a position of judicial restraint, which 
values deference to the legislature and limited judicial interference,12 does 
not allow the judge to escape the subjective influences that are inevitably 
part of decision-making.13  By denying these subjective influences and 
                                                                                                                 
techniques created greater predictability, but arguing that such an approach in fact did the 
opposite because it ignored the subjective factors that inevitably influence every judge and 
judicial decision). 
 6.  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881). 
 7. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401; see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal 
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 363 (1973) (arguing that “values, wants, purposes, desires” 
inform every human action. This is crucial because the experience of values not only defines 
the state of being human, it also motivates all genuinely human action.”). 
 8.  Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 511 
(1988) (discussing the traditional herculean judicial model set forth in American culture and 
arguing that the ideal of “Judge Hercules,” positioned on high above the human condition, 
troublingly removes the judge from the community and “undermines his humanity”). 
 9.  See generally Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of 
Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REV. 777, 788 (1938) (distinguishing judicial review from 
scientific analysis and arguing that in the judiciary “a prediction as probable as that of the 
physicist predicting the result of a time-worn experiment would not be possible. For in the 
experiment every element not present in the prior observations is painstakingly excluded. 
Such exclusion is not possible in the actual behavior situations of every-day life, including 
that in which the particular judge is to act.”). 
 10. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437 (explaining that ignoring the subjective factors that 
contribute to judicial review “prevents these ‘non-technical’ considerations from being 
talked and written about. It prevents their possible rationalization and systematization.”). 
 11. See generally Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Pound, supra note 9, at 788. 
 12. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 449, 450 (1994) (explaining that judicial restraint is a “policy regarding judicial review 
of the constitutionality of legislation, a policy according to which courts, and especially the 
U.S. Supreme Court, should adopt a cautious or ‘deferential’ attitude toward voiding 
legislation on constitutional grounds”). 
 13. See Wendy Brown Scott, Oliver Wendell Holmes on Equality and Adarand, 47 
HOW. L.J. 59, 64 (2003) (discussing Holmes’s departure from traditional formalism and 
judicial restraint and accepting that the law is influenced by the “subjective, indeterminate, 
and pragmatic” experiences of the judge); see also Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 398 
(distinguishing between the use of judicial restraint in easy cases and the difficulty of 
restraint in harder cases, framing his argument around the theory that “[h]ard cases make bad 
2015] THE GREAT TACTICIAN 151 
clinging to a belief that a restrained position creates an objective, 
predictable result denies the opportunity to confront and discuss the many 
factors that actually influence judicial decision-making.14 
However, it is not an overly pessimistic perspective or a harbinger 
of disaster to accept the impossibility of true objectivity or consistent 
judicial restraint.  Such acceptance does not invalidate the authority of the 
judiciary; in fact, it might do the exact opposite.  The social sciences have 
long ago given up the utopic idea that humans can apply analysis without 
the influence of their humanness.15  Many social scientists would argue that 
the dismissal of fictional objectivity has validated their science, brought 
them closer to egalitarianism, and helped dissipate Eurocentric influence.16  
But is the law so similarly situated as to benefit from a frank look at judicial 
interpretation or do we need this fiction of rightness?  Does the whole thing 
come crumbling down if the façade is dismantled? 
This note argues that true judicial restraint is a fictional 
impossibility.  Any practice of judicial restraint is at the very same moment 
an exercise of judicial activism because a judge cannot approach the law 
from a truly objective, mechanical position.17  Every judicial opinion is 
influenced not only by the political and moral vantage point of the judge, 
but also the judge’s policy and societal concerns.18  This thesis is illustrated 
by a case study of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
and, specifically, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion regarding the individual 
mandate and the Medicaid provision of the Affordable Care Act.  Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion demonstrates how even with the best intentions of 
deference, the judiciary is inevitably influenced by partisanship, personal 
experience, the current temper of the court, the perceived needs and desires 
of the majority, and any number of other factors that make it impossible to 
have a truly objective, deferential judiciary. 
                                                                                                                 
law,” and explaining that “the proposition that the greater the felt need, because of felt sense, 
the wider is the leeway correctly and properly available in reshaping an authority or the 
authorities.  What is both proper and to be expected in an extreme case would become abuse 
and judicial usurpation if made daily practice in the mine-run of cases.”) (emphasis in the 
original); Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1304 (“[w]hat is inherent 
is that the man must always enter into the result: it is he who must read the words of the rule 
of law, it is he who must size up the facts as to whether a rule of law applies. No rule of law 
ever applied itself.”). 
 14. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437. 
 15. See generally MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 75 
(1949) (arguing that in order to explain laws and factors one must do so through their own 
individualized configurations). 
 16. See generally id. at 64–66 (discussing the challenge social scientists face when 
attempting to distinguish between “value-judgments” and “empirical knowledge,” with the 
latter requiring scientists to “discuss the meaning of objectively ‘valid’ truths” while 
consecutively requiring them to reconcile varying viewpoints that emerge when describing 
these so-called truths). 
 17. See generally Fuller, supra note 5, at 437; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Pound, 
supra note 9, at 788. 
 18. See generally Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1304. 
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Roberts’s opinion has been touted as an exemplary piece of judicial 
scholarship and a superb act of statesmanship.19  Legal scholars have 
celebrated his opinion as a win for bipartisanship and congratulated the 
Chief Justice on his ability to turn his back on political influences and 
concentrate instead on a restrained interpretation of the Affordable Care 
Act.20  He has been lauded for sticking to the law, for demonstrating 
impartiality and deference, and for formulating an opinion that shows the 
Court can be a place of political and partisan refuge.21  Chief Justice 
Roberts has long espoused a dedication to judicial restraint. In his Senate 
Confirmation Hearings, Roberts analogized the role of the judge to the role 
of an impartial umpire and advocated for restraint, humility, and a limited 
judiciary role.22  In Sebelius, Roberts again cited a philosophy of judicial 
restraint by explaining that “[m]embers of the Court are vested with the 
authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor 
prerogative to make policy judgments.”23 
However, a careful read of the Sebelius decision shows that Roberts 
did not actually practice judicial restraint but judicial activism coupled with 
significant policy judgments.  Roberts argues the role of the Court is to 
“give Congress great latitude in exercising its powers.”24  Yet, it is exactly 
                                                 
 19. See Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and 
the Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118–19 (2012) (arguing that Roberts’s 
“opinion transcended the polarized political debates surrounding the legal challenge to 
President Barack Obama’s signature domestic policy initiative through analytical 
convergence, not political compromise”); Brian P. Kane, Everyone Was Right and Everyone 
Was Wrong: The Subtle Echoes of the Supreme Court’s Healthcare Reform Decision, 
ADVOCATE: OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE B., Aug. 2012, at 54, 56 (touting 
Roberts’s opinion for its “commitment not only to adhere strictly to the law, but also to 
avoid inserting his or the Court’s policy choices” and finding that “his opinion is likely to 
become a hallmark of judicial minimalism because of the multiple opportunities that the 
Court had to strike broadly, but instead patiently and surgically upheld with minimal 
removal”); John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 No. 6 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1, 1 (2012) (applauding 
Roberts’s Sebelius decision for “navigating these [political] currents in a manner that 
extricated the Court from a political firestorm that would have threatened the Court’s 
legitimacy and institutional standing following a decade of politically-charged rulings 
without changing the Court’s conservative trajectory”). 
 20. See generally Minow, supra note 19; Kane, supra note 19; DiMugno, supra note 
19. 
 21. See generally Minow, supra note 19; Kane, supra note 19; Dimungo, supra note 
19.  
 22. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 
(2005) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement by John G. Roberts, Jr.) (basing his 
judicial perspective on the “humility [that] should characterize the judicial role.”  Arguing 
that “[j]udges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like 
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.  The role of an umpire and a judge 
is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by the rules.  But it is a limited role.”). 
 23.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 24.  Id. (Roberts goes on to adopt the proposition: “‘[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
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this latitude that Roberts denies Congress in Sebelius.  As will be 
demonstrated below, Roberts could have upheld both the individual 
mandate and Medicaid provision under the Commerce Clause and the 
power to tax and spend, respectively.  His decision to limit both the 
Commerce Clause and the Tax and Spend power was not done from a 
position of restraint, but from a position of policy, informed by his 
subjective experience and political perspective.  The Sebelius decision is 
not an example of judicial restraint and bipartisanship; instead, it is an 
example of judicial activism—illustrative of the partisanship inherent in the 
judiciary. 
This note will examine judicial restraint and the Sebelius decision 
in five parts.  First, it will be necessary to explore the history of judicial 
restraint and its past and present applications.  Second, the note will 
distinguish between legal realism and legal formalism and examine the rise 
of realism in the Critical Legal Studies Movement.  Third, Roberts’s actual 
decision and his alleged application of judicial restraint will be investigated.  
Fourth, the individual mandate and Medicaid provision will be examined 
through the government’s initial arguments to uphold them under the 
Commerce Clause and Tax and Spend power respectively, thereby 
demonstrating that Roberts could have easily decided in the converse.  
Finally, after examining the choices available to Roberts, this note will 
explain why his espoused philosophy of restraint was used to do just the 
opposite and was actually an example of activism.  Through an assessment 
of the Sebelius decision, this note argues that judicial restraint is an illusion 
and that any judicial decision is inevitably a form of activism, imbued with 
the subjective influences and experiences of the judge. 
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT APPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT 
Judicial restraint is best categorized as a judicial policy that 
provides “a structural relationship between the judiciary and the other 
branches of government.”25  It is a policy of judicial review based on 
deference and a presumption of constitutionality.26  Under a traditional 
restrained perspective, a judge will uphold legislation if there is any way to 
do so under the constitutional framework and will only overturn a piece of 
legislation when it is clearly unconstitutional or an abuse of constitutional 
power.27 
                                                                                                                 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.’” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 
(1819)). 
 25.  Luban, supra note 12, at 450. 
 26.  Id. at 450–51. 
 27.  Id.; Timothy P. O’Neill, Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the 
Affordable Care Act, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 170, 172 (2012). 
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Harvard professor James Bradley Thayer promulgated the classical 
conception of judicial restraint in 1893.28  Under Thayer’s brand of judicial 
restraint, a judge will refrain from striking down a legislative act even if it 
was constitutionally incorrect and will only intervene for clear error or 
abuse of discretion.29  Thayerism attracted some of the judiciary’s greatest 
minds,30 and although its most extreme application has been replaced with 
more moderate views of restraint, it is still influential in framing the 
discourse about policies of deference and restraint.31 
The emergence of Thayerism in the late 19th Century created a 
“kind of intellectual Gemeinschaft,” counting among its members Justices 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter as well as 
Learned Hand and Yale law professor, Alexander Bickel.32  However, even 
beginning with Holmes, who proclaimed his theories to be succinct with 
Thayer, Thayerism immediately began to distort and fray around the edges 
in the hands of Thayerian judges and professors.33 
Thayer not only believed that the legislature was usually right, but 
also that the legislative branch creatively and responsibly applied and 
considered their constitutional limitations in the creation of law.34  These 
beliefs, serving as the basis for pure Thayerian restraint, along with the 
difficulty of applying his stringent model of restraint, marked its demise.  
With the emergence of competing theories used for deciding difficult 
constitutional cases, the validity of Thayer’s approach waned.35  Under a 
pure application of Thayer’s model of restraint, a judge would have to 
uphold a decision, even if she believed it unconstitutional, unless it was 
clearly erroneous and unreasonable.36  With difficult constitutional issues, 
Thayerism offered no real guidance and no viable avenue for finding a 
statute unconstitutional.37  Thus, in practice, the key members of “The 
                                                 
 28.  Luban, supra note 12, at 451. 
 29.  O’Neill, supra note 27, at 172. 
 30.  See Luban, supra note 12, at 451 (noting classical restraint theorists such as 
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter). 
 31.  See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. 
REV. 519, 522, 533 (2012) (explaining that Thayerism “died for a variety of reasons: it 
rested on false premises about judicial deliberation; it lacked coherence,” and further noting 
that although Thayerism faded away, the ideology of judicial restraint remains, even if it is 
only a “vague, all-purpose compliment”). 
 32.  Luban, supra note 12, at 450–51. 
 33.  See Posner, supra note 31, at 522 (finding that Thayerism died because “it lacked 
coherence—the Thayerians did not constitute a community of thought; it had no stopping 
point—once you embraced it, you could not explain why a law would ever be declared 
unconstitutional; it was vulnerable to the rise of constitutional theories; and it was given its 
coup de grâce by a combination of decisions by the liberal Warren Court and the refusal of 
the conservative successors to Justices of the Warren Court to accept a ratchet theory of 
judicial succession.”). 
 34.  Id. at 525. 
 35.  Id. at 535. 
 36.  Id. at 522–23. 
 37.  Id. at 522. 
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School of Thayer” interpreted judicial restraint through the lenses of their 
personal philosophies and the pure application of Thayer’s model of 
judicial restraint faded away.38 
Perhaps the last quasi-Thayerian was Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
a man Richard Posner identified as the “the last restrained justice.”39  
Harlan adopted judicial restraint as a form of humility and a path to 
upholding federalism and the separation of powers.40  He believed that 
judicial restraint was the best way for a judge to keep his personal beliefs, 
politics, and influences in check, and that deference to legislative action 
was the key to upholding states’ rights, the political process, and 
constitutional clarity.41  Harlan’s philosophy of restraint demonstrates the 
influence of Thayer’s model but removes Thayer’s extreme practice of 
deference when faced with a complex issue of constitutional law.  Although 
Harlan believed that judicial restraint was key to an effective and 
responsible judiciary, his philosophy did not rely on Thayer’s belief that the 
legislature was presumably smarter and wiser nor did he advocate for 
Holmes’s soldier-like obedience and deference.42  In practice, Harlan’s 
brand of judicial restraint was accomplished through a constant respect for 
federalism, separation of powers, and consistent acknowledgment of the 
needs, values, and desires of the majority.43 
                                                 
 39.  See Posner, supra note 31, at 522. Justice Holmes took perhaps the most 
influential Thayerist approach, evolving his initial perspective of judicial restraint into an 
entirely new legal philosophy and giving birth to Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies 
movement, as will be discussed below. See Fuller, supra note 5.  Justice Holmes equated a 
judge’s position to that of a soldier, one who follows orders regardless of their wisdom and 
attempts to constantly keep subjective influences at bay. See Luban, supra note 12, at 489–
90 (citing Holmes’s famous judicial perspective; “‘I always say, as you know, that if my 
fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.’”) (quoting Letter from 
Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, at 
248–49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953)). However, as discussed below, his divergence 
from Thayerism was rooted in a growing skepticism of the judiciary’s ability to objectively 
apply the law. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64. 
  Bickel and Brandeis also applied their own touches to Thayer’s model of judicial 
restraint. See Luban, supra note 12, at 453 (noting how “Bickel, following up on the famous 
opinion of Brandeis, advocated the ‘passive virtues’: a strategy of dodging of constitutional 
issues by means of jurisdictional devices.”); Posner, supra note 31, at 532 (noting Bickel’s 
basis for judicial restraint was grounded in prudence and a belief that restraint was a moral 
path to making sure the judiciary did not overly influence the majority). 
 40.  Posner, supra note 31, at 533. 
 41.  See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 179. 
 42.  See generally id. 
 43.  Id. at 180–82 (noting that Harlan’s “‘idea of federalism is, itself, a kind of balance-
-a way of dividing governmental authority to prevent a too-easy dominance of public life by 
a single institution or faction’” (citing Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, Civil 
Liberties, and the Warren Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 101 (1991)) and further noting 
that when Harlan thought a case called for substantial action, he would go far to uphold a 
statute, even adding language if need be (referring to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh 
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 44.  See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 501–02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(disagreeing with Justices Black and Stewart that judicial restraint will be accomplished by a 
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Although Posner might believe Harlan was the last restrained 
justice, Chief Justice Roberts attempts to follow in his footsteps.  During his 
Senate Confirmation Hearings, Justice Roberts adopted Justice Harlan’s 
technique of constitutional interpretation, noting specifically Justice 
Harlan’s “sensitivity to the limitations on the judicial role.”44  It is Harlan’s 
brand of judicial restraint that Roberts identified as most influential to his 
own judicial philosophy during his confirmation hearings and what he 
attempted to practice in Sebelius.45  Throughout his opinion, Roberts notes 
the limited role of the judiciary and the deference that must be given to 
legislative action.46  However, as will be illustrated below, this attempt at 
judicial restraint was actually a form of judicial activism and evidences the 
impossibility of true restraint. 
II. LEGAL FORMALISM VERSUS LEGAL REALISM AND THE 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 
Regardless of the incongruous adaptations of Thayerism, it 
influenced, and perhaps even gave birth to, the dueling philosophies of 
legal formalism and legal realism.  In Justice Holmes’s divergence from 
Thayer’s faith in the legislative branch, he was also skeptical about the 
ability of the judiciary to objectively apply the law.47  Although he valued 
the practice and philosophy of judicial restraint, Justice Holmes’s 
perspective evolved into a belief that the application of law is inescapably 
influenced by the subjective elements of human experience.48  In The 
Common Law, Holmes stated that “the life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience,” and in that succinct phrase he gave birth to the idea 
of legal realism.49  The acknowledgment of the subjective experience in 
judicial action created a schism from legal formalism, which was the 
dominant view in Holmes’s time, and it is a dichotomy that grounded the 
                                                                                                                 
narrow application of due process, limited to the right enumerated in the constitution and 
explaining that judicial self-restraint “will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional 
areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great 
roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing 
and preserving American freedoms . . . . Adherence to these principles will not, of course, 
obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it.  Their 
continued recognition will, however, go farther toward keeping most judges from roaming at 
large in the constitutional field than will the interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial 
and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 45.  Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 259. 
 46.  See id.; O’Neill, supra note 27, at 171–72. 
 47.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 48.  See Scott, supra note 13, at 64. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id.; Fuller, supra note 5, at 429. 
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legal realism movement and remains a sticking point in today’s debates on 
judicial philosophy.50 
a) Legal Formalism 
Formalism permeated legal scholarship among 19th and early 20th 
Century jurists, in which there was a search for and a belief in the “built-in 
legal structure of the democracy and the market.”51  This legal structure 
provided the policies, rules, and materials that grounded judicial decision-
making and was rooted in the belief of a “universal legal language.”52  This 
philosophy, like judicial restraint, centered on the clear delineation of 
responsibility among the branches of government, and mechanically relied 
on the idea of the legislature’s role to make laws and the judiciary’s role to 
apply them without question or acknowledgment of subjective influence on 
the judiciary.53 
Formalism is directly linked to judicial restraint.  Richard Posner 
posits that there are three categories of judicial restraint and the first and 
foremost is born from an adoption of legal formalism.54  As Posner 
explains, judicial restraint is manifested from the belief that judges merely 
apply the law, they do not make it.55  This formalist philosophy was also 
illustrated by Roberts himself when he referred to the judge as merely an 
                                                 
 51.  Scott, supra note 13, at 64 (“[a]ccording to Holmes, the law is informed by 
experience. Because experience is subjective, indeterminate, and pragmatic, Holmes’s 
position represented a significant departure from the formalist legal philosophy of his 
time.”); see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Book Review: Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and 
Practice by Karl N. Llewellyn, 41 TEX. L. REV. 609, 609–10 (1963) (explaining that legal 
realists focus on “factors outside the positive sources of law which in their opinion are apt to 
influence judicial action significantly, such as the personality of the judge, his conscious or 
subconscious value preferences, his social philosophy, and his intuitive response to the 
totality of the facts in a litigated case.”). 
 52.  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 561, 567 (1983). 
 53.  Id. at 568. 
 54.  See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 352–59 (explaining the formalist “idea that the 
legitimate legal sovereign, representing the citizenry, should make rules applying to the 
various situations in which state coercion might be used.  Judges should then apply those 
rules, acting as agents of the sovereign.”) (emphasis in the original) (Kennedy goes on to 
explain that the nature of rule application was thought to be mechanical. “[The judge] must 
never ask whether giving this particular response, in light of the total situation including but 
not limited to the per se elements, is best”) (emphasis in the original). 
 55.  See Posner, supra note 31, at 520–21 (explaining the three categories of restraint 
as “(1) judges apply law, they don’t make it (call this ‘legalism’—though ‘formalism’ is the 
commoner name—or, better, ‘the law made me do it’); (2) judges defer to a very great extent 
to decisions by other officials—appellate judges defer to trial judges and administrative 
agencies, and all judges to legislative and executive decisions (call this ‘modesty,’ or 
‘institutional competence,’ or ‘process jurisprudence’); (3) judges are highly reluctant to 
declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional—deference is at its zenith when 
action is challenged as unconstitutional (call this ‘constitutional restraint’)”). 
 56.  Id. 
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umpire; a figure limited to interpreting the law and never imposing on the 
game itself.56  As Duncan Kennedy explains, the formalists believe that 
“[r]ule application, in sharp contrast, involves the objective or ‘cognitive’ 
operation of identifying particular factual aspects of situations followed by 
the execution of unambiguous prescriptions for official action. In short, 
according to the theory of formality, it is inherently certain and 
predictable.”57  This belief in certainty and predictability is the basis for 
judicial restraint due to the belief that the more limited and deferential the 
judiciary, the more objective and foreseeable their actions.58  Formalism 
suggests that the law can be determined on objective facts and, thus, the 
judiciary need not ever question the wisdom of the law, only whether it fits 
within the constraints of the Constitution.59 
This formalistic judicial philosophy gave birth to the idea of the 
judge as a herculean figure, one composed of staunch judicial restraint and 
deference, demonstrating steadfast commitment to “intellectual 
disinterestedness.”60  As Robert Ferguson explained, such a philosophy 
promulgated the idea that “[j]udges are in but not of the world.”61 
Perhaps the most readily identifiable formalist is Justice Antonin 
Scalia.  Justice Scalia is an originalist in his constitutional interpretation and 
a textualist in his statutory interpretation,62 perspectives he believes lend 
themselves to proper formalistic strategy.63  Scalia expressed the idea that 
adhesion to form and clear, readily applicable rules is the only way for the 
judiciary to make “as little law as possible.”64  For Scalia, formalism is the 
identification and application of a general rule above all else.  These rules 
are pulled strictly from the Congress or the Constitution, and where there is 
ambiguity, it is the job of the judiciary to use the proper legal materials to 
identify “some precise, principled content.”65  Through the identification 
and application of general legal rules, Scalia believes the judiciary gets 
closer to the ultimate goal of predictability.66  In order to avoid “protracted 
uncertainty” and achieve predictability, “there are times when even a bad 
rule is better than no rule at all.”67 
                                                 
 57.  Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 55. 
 58.  Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364 (emphasis in the original). 
 59.  See Fuller, supra note 5, at 435–37 (noting that traditionalist judicial philosophy 
values a restrained judiciary that bases its decisions on the technical aspects of the law 
because such an approach leads to greater predictability). 
 60.  See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 359. 
 61.  Ferguson, supra note 8, at 511–13. 
 62.  Id. at 515. 
 62. Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 Emory L.J. 1195, 
1250 (2009). 
 63. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175 (1989). 
 64. Id. at 1179. 
 65. Id. at 1182–83. 
 66. Scalia, supra note 63, at 1179. 
 67. Id. at 1179. 
2015] THE GREAT TACTICIAN 159 
More than even judicial restraint, Scalia urges judicial constraint. 
He argues that by adopting general rules the Court not only constrains its 
decisions to those rules but implements constraints on the lower courts.68  
He further argues that although other interpretative philosophies do not 
preclude an adherence to formalism, his originalist and textualist 
perspectives are especially well-suited to the judiciary’s formulaic task.69  
By adhering to the “plain meaning of the text” and the original meaning of 
the Constitution, Scalia finds a basis for constraint and a better-suited 
perspective for identifying and limiting a case to the general rule of law.70  
Scalia’s promotion of judicial constraint, adherence to generally acceptable 
and recognizable rules of law, and the pursuit of predictability through such 
constraints are the cornerstones of formalism and the converse of these 
ideals provide the basis for understanding realism. 
Legal formalism is directly opposed to legal realism. Formalism 
originates in a basic, simplified, division of labor between law-maker (the 
legislature) and law application (the judiciary).71  Formalists recognize a set 
of principles, methodology, policies, and other tools given to the rule 
appliers by the rule makers, and any decision either encapsulates those 
principles and policies or has nothing to do with them.72  Through this labor 
division, formalism creates a judicial philosophy that is divorced from the 
sociological, ideological, philosophical, or psychological.73  It creates a 
limited and narrow jurisprudence that applies impersonal, objective 
principles and policies, and does not allow for any outside subjective 
influence.74  Any ideological manifestation is left to the law-maker and the 
law-applier is limited to the rules, procedure, and policy explicitly 
guaranteed in the constitution or by statute.75 
b)  Legal Realism 
Legal realism attempts to buck the yoke of traditional, formulaic 
jurisprudence, by demonstrating that judicial predictability is virtually 
impossible.  Realists posit that predictability is only possible by embracing 
the subjectivity of judicial action.  First, it is impossible to achieve any 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 1179–80. 
 69. Id. at 1184. 
 70. Id. (advocating for an “adherence to a more or less originalist theory of 
construction.  The raw material for the general rule is readily apparent.  If a barn was not 
considered the curtilage of a house in 1791 or 1868 and the Fourth Amendment did not 
cover it, then unlawful entry into a barn today may be a trespass, but not an unconstitutional 
search and seizure.”). 
 71.  See Posner, supra note 31, at 520 (basing formalism on the theory of a division of 
labor in which the legislature makes the law and the judiciary only interprets it). 
 72. See, Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364 (explaining that formalistic rule application is 
based solely on objective and cognitive facts and laws). 
 73. See generally, Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364; Fuller, supra note 5, at 434–35. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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predictability when one ignores relevant factors that influence judicial 
action.76  Hemming judges into traditional methods of analysis not only 
makes it impossible to guess when they will circumvent such rigidity, but it 
also makes it difficult to create a valid forum of discourse when scholars 
voluntary accept the blindfold of formulism and ignore all glimpses of non-
traditional analysis.77  As Roberto Unger explains, there is perpetual 
“indeterminacy through generalization.”78 
Legal realism strives to change the traditional philosophy of 
formalism by creating a more authentic view of the judiciary and the 
personal abilities of judges themselves.  Realists acknowledge that judges 
do indeed make law, and they do so not only with the materials of 
procedure, structure, and rules provided by statute and constitutional 
provisions, but also through the “situation around and before them.”79  Karl 
Llewellyn, one of the key founders of legal realism, has often noted that 
realism is not a school or movement; it does not embody one concise 
theory.80  It is instead a philosophical approach with diverging branches; 
some more extreme than others.  Yet, all branches of realism base their 
philosophy on a few common, key principles, as identified by Llewellyn.81 
Two such principles are the acceptance that elements outside of 
procedure and rules influence judicial action82 and the acknowledgment of 
the aggregation of judicial theory and the social sciences.83  Legal realists 
reject a functional, universal legal perspective that judges could and should 
decide cases strictly on the rules and traditional materials available to them 
and adopt the more inclusive view of the social sciences.  Justice Holmes 
originally formulated this idea by distinguishing logic from experience.84 
Justice Holmes believed the law does not develop based strictly on 
objective factors such as procedure, facts, and precedent, but is also shaped 
and manifested by the individual experience of the judge.85  His position, 
distinguishing objective logic from subjective experience, began the entire 
                                                 
 76. Fuller, supra note 5, at 437. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Unger, supra note 51, at 569. 
 80.  Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296. 
 81.  See Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 609; Llewellyn, Some Realism About 
Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1233 (1931) [hereinafter 
Llewellyn, Some Realism]. 
 82.  See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 80, at 1235–38 (explaining the various 
categories of legal realism philosophy that tie the theory together). 
 83. See Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 609; Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 80, 
at 1237. 
 84.  See Pound, supra note 9, at 785–86 (touting the important of social science and 
social psychology on legal scholarship, stating that “[s]ociological jurists, as part of their 
insistence on unification of the social sciences, have for a generation emphasized the place 
of social psychology in their program.”). 
 85. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 1. 
 86.  See Scott, supra note 13, at 64. 
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realist movement, which acknowledged the impossibility of true objectivity 
and embraced the implicit subjectivity within analysis.86 
From these two key concepts of realism emerged both extreme and 
moderate viewpoints, with Llewellyn leading the side of the moderates.  
One of the crucial debates between moderates and extremists is the 
approach to legal uncertainty.  Legal formalism’s main goals were to create 
judicial certainty, predictability, and the basic rules that provide for both.87  
Legal realism, in both its extreme and moderate branches, works to subvert 
this strategy.  Roscoe Pound, who founded the most extreme form of legal 
realism, “conceives of each item of the judicial process as shaped wholly 
and inexorably by the psychological determinations of the behavior of the 
individual judge.”88  For moderate realists, legal certainty is not an 
impossibility, but can only be achieved by acknowledging the effects of 
psychology and culture on judicial action.89 
c) The Critical Legal Studies Movement 
The Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) movement developed from the 
many branches of realistic, leftist modern thought with scholars Roberto 
Unger and Duncan Kennedy in the vanguard.90  Critical Legal Studies is 
often seen as an answer to those judges who espouse judicial restraint and 
deference “as code words for the personal intellectual rigor of the judge 
who, it is presumed, remains aloof while deciding a case.”91  The CLS 
movement disavows such judicial assertions by finding that the “‘law is 
simply politics by other means’ and that legal reasoning is a myth.”92 
Roberto Unger has identified two facets of the CLS movement.  The first 
focuses on the view that legal doctrine is an illustration of one’s vision of 
society, which embodies and demonstrates the suppressive and 
manipulative character of such a doctrine.93  The second idea, which Unger 
notes has decreased in popularity, is the view that legal doctrines reinforce 
and sustain social hierarchy and divisions.94 
The CLS movement is a voice speaking loudly against formalism, 
and it purports to cast judicial action completely outside the realm of 
predictability and adherence to legal norms and methods.95  It admonishes 
traditional formalism for ignoring the influence of the market, social 
                                                 
 87.  See id.; see also Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., Legal Realism, Sociological 
Jurisprudence and Mr. Justice Holmes, 26 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 547, 548–49 (1965). 
 88.  See Scalia, supra note 63, at 1179. 
 89.  Pound, supra note 9, at 787. 
 90.  See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437. 
 91.  Unger, supra note 51, at 564. 
 92.  Ferguson, supra note 8, at 513. 
 93.  Id. (citing David Kairys, ed., THE POLITICS OF LAW, n.14 (1982)). 
 94.  Unger, supra note 51, at n.1. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See generally id. at 673–76. 
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science, philosophy, and psychology, and advocates for a judicial 
perspective that takes into account the influence of cultural and societal 
factors on judicial action.96  Many CLS scholars believe that recognizing 
the inevitable subjective influences on judicial decision-making not only 
brings predictability one step closer, but also serves to subvert social 
hierarchy and division.97 
Although critics of CLS, and legal realism in general, argue that 
they fail to assist the judiciary in making any distinctions between proper 
and improper basis for judgment,98 advocates praise these theories for their 
candor in recognizing the shortcomings of traditional judicial legal theory.  
All branches of realism not only show the stifling limitations of strict 
formalism, they offer the possibility of other options in thought, process, 
and action.99  Realism’s purpose, and one it shares with Critical Legal 
Studies, is to “discredit, once and for all, the conception of a system of 
social types with a built-in institutional structure.”100 
The remainder of this paper seeks to demonstrate the fallibility of a 
system that relies on one institutional structure.  Such fallibility is 
demonstrated by the belief there is a difference between judicial activism 
and judicial restraint, and the unfortunate, antiquated assumption that the 
judiciary’s saving grace is in the latter.101  Formalistic judicial theories are 
used to reconcile a dichotomy of correctness that does not exist and that 
willfully turns a blind eye to substantive theories of politics and rights.102  
In the search for one right answer, be it a case or judicial philosophy, 
traditional formalism shines a light on its own weakness.103  Consequently, 
it is through adherence to this weakness that the system remains mired in 
partisanship.104 
                                                 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 674–75 (“When we came, they were like a priesthood that had lost their faith 
and kept their jobs.  They stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars.  But we turned 
away from those altars, and found the mind’s opportunity in the heart’s revenge.”). 
 99.  Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 612. 
 100. See Unger, supra note 51, at 577 (“The disintegration of such theories, which has 
been the dominant feature of recent social thought, creates an opportunity for normative and 
programmatic ideas . . .”). 
 101. Id. at 570. 
 102. Id. at 572. 
 103. Id. at 573 (explaining that attempting to rescue doctrines from valid critiques are 
“makeshift apologies”); see also Fuller, supra note 5, at 435 (referring to the tortured 
practice of reconciling particular theoretical legal doctrines with the practical law judges 
must apply which ultimately ignores essential humanitarian considerations). 
 104. See Unger, supra note 51, at 573; Fuller, supra note 5, at 435. 
 105. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401 (demonstrating the 
seemingly polar results one gets when applying varying theories on the canons of 
construction). 
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III.  THE SEBELIUS DECISION AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S 
RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s judicial philosophy is rooted in 
judicial restraint.  During his 2005 Senate Confirmation Hearings, Roberts 
responded to Vice President (then-Senator) Biden that an appropriate 
judicial perspective revolved around a practice of “judicial humility” which 
gives due deference to precedent and the separation of powers.105  Roberts 
further grounded his judicial perspective in the belief that judges are “not 
individuals promoting their own particular views, but they are supposed to 
be doing their best to interpret the law, to interpret the Constitution, 
according to the rule of law, not their own preferences, not their own 
personal beliefs.  That’s the ideal.”106 
Roberts further embraced judicial restraint as the basis for his 
decision in Sebelius.  Roberts explained that the Court’s approach should 
demonstrate a “general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s 
elected leaders,” and the actions of the legislature should only be struck 
down when an act clearly oversteps the legislature’s constitutional 
power.107  Roberts explained that judicial restraint is rooted in the very 
nature of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature by 
emphasizing that “members of this Court are vested with the authority to 
interpret law,” not the power to make law or policy judgments.108  Judicial 
restraint, according to the Roberts, is crucial to the separation of powers 
because it is the legislature and not the judiciary that bears the burden of 
making law and policy.109  Additionally, Roberts acknowledged that only 
the legislature is voted for by the people and, thus, speaks with the voice of 
the people.110  Due to that relationship and the power that must be retained 
by the people, Roberts clarified that it is not the Court’s job to “protect 
people from the consequences of their political choices.”111  Roberts 
emphasized that the role of the Court is to uphold the will of the people 
whenever possible, regardless of the wisdom of their choices, as long as 
such laws and policies can be found constitutional.112 
It is with this philosophy of judicial restraint that Roberts ostensibly 
interpreted the Affordable Care Act.  Throughout the Sebelius decision, 
Roberts grounded his analysis in judicial deference to Congress.113  He 
argued a legislative act should be upheld as long as the act is within the 
                                                 
 106. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 55. 
 107. Id. at 205. 
 108. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579. 
 114. See id. 
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bounds of the Constitution, and114 that “‘every reasonable construction [of 
an act] must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.’”115  Through this philosophy and deference, Roberts 
analyzed the constitutionality of both the individual mandate and the 
Medicaid provision. 
a) Chief Justice Roberts declined to find the individual mandate a 
valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power. 
Under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the individual mandate 
states all “applicable individuals” shall maintain minimum health 
insurance.116  A penalty fee will be assessed to any such individual who 
fails to maintain minimum health insurance coverage, which is to be paid 
with their tax return.117  In Sebelius, the government argued that the 
individual mandate should be upheld under the Commerce Clause and if 
not, then alternatively under Congress’s power to tax and spend.118  
Roberts, along with four other conservative justices,119 disagreed that the 
individual mandate was a valid exercise of the congressional commerce 
power.120  However, basing his analysis on the principles of judicial 
restraint, Roberts found the penalty is a tax and upheld the individual 
mandate as constitutional per the Tax and Spend Clause.121 
Chief Justice Roberts found the individual mandate exceeded 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.122  Roberts identified the 
difference between regulating commerce and compelling commerce and 
found Congress had no power to force individuals into the market.123  
Roberts likened the insurance mandate to a congressional directive to 
                                                 
 115. Id. at 2594 (“[t]he question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of 
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
 116. Id. (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). 
 117. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2014); see § 5000A(d) (defining “applicable individuals” 
as all individuals except those meeting an exemption per § 5000A(d)(2)–(4) and (e) 
including but not limited to those individuals meeting the religious conscience and health 
care sharing ministry exemptions, incarcerated individuals, those who are not legally present 
in the country, and those not meeting the minimum income to bear the penalty). 
 118. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1)–(2). 
 119. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 120. See id. at 2642–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito). 
 121. Id. at 2591, 2644; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Commerce Clause 
reads as follow: “Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 122. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (The Tax and 
Spend Clause reads as follows: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.”). 
 123. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591. 
 124. Id. at 2589. 
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Americans to buy more vegetables and noted that allowing the government 
to affect the market in such a way would authorize Congress to compel 
behavior under the Commerce Clause in a manner the framers never 
intended.124 
Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the individual mandate from the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act’s wheat quotas in Wickard v. Fillburn, 
whereby the Court upheld a federal penalty against a wheat farmer for 
growing beyond his quota for personal consumption.125  Even though the 
Act compelled the farmer to participate in the market by purchasing wheat 
for personal use as opposed to growing it, Roberts found such compulsion 
was distinguishable from the individual mandate because the farmer was 
already part of the wheat market.126  Roberts reasoned that unlike the farmer 
in Wickard, individuals are not continuously “active in the market for health 
care.”127  Although the government argued all individuals are active in the 
healthcare market because they will require healthcare services at some 
point in their lives, Roberts equated this reasoning to the purchase of an 
automobile.128  He argued that even though an individual bought a car two 
years ago and is likely to buy a car again in the future, such a presumption 
does not make that individual active in the automobile market in the 
interim.129 
With this analysis, Roberts found the individual mandate exceeded 
Congress’s grant of power under the Commerce Clause and, thus, placed a 
firm limitation on the scope of that power.130  Roberts feared that allowing 
Congress to compel activity through the Commerce Clause would create a 
                                                 
 125. Id. at 2588–89. 
 126. Id. at 2587–88; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113–115, 124–25, 130 
(1942) (In this case, the appellee farmer argued that the marketing penalty assessed under 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (“AAA”) was unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.  The farmer harvested 11.9 acres of wheat, much of which was to be 
used for personal consumption and the feeding of livestock, but the wheat quota instituted by 
the AAA was set at 11.1 acres.  Even though the farmer’s excess harvest was minimal and 
for personal use, the Court found that Congress had the right under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate such consumption.  The Court explained the breadth of the Commerce Clause, 
holding that Congress’ commerce power “may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.”  The Court 
further distinguished between direct and indirect commercial activity and found that “even if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some 
earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”). 
 127. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2588. 
 128. Id. at 2589–90. 
 129. Id. at 2590. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 2591; see also Minow, supra note 19, at 140 (discussing the Commerce 
Clause limitations created by the Sebelius decision and noting that Roberts addressed the 
“parade of horribles” that could come to pass by allowing Congress such a broad scope of 
power under the Commerce Clause, including the power to compel purchases of an 
unlimited number of products from broccoli to automobiles). 
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slippery slope allowing congressional mandates to purchase almost any 
product from broccoli to automobiles.131  Roberts further found that because 
the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of commerce power, it was 
also beyond the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.132 
However, Roberts did not end his analysis with the Commerce or 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, but looked to whether the individual 
mandate could be upheld under the power to tax and spend.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, siding with the four liberal justices, found that the mandated 
penalty was a tax.133  Roberts found the penalty could be interpreted as a 
tax, regardless of the fact that it was explicably termed a penalty under the 
ACA.134  Roberts explained that the “question is not whether that is the 
most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly 
possible’ one.”135 
Roberts sided with the government’s alternative argument and 
found the penalty to be a tax for several reasons.  First, the amount assessed 
is less than the cost of insurance and, thus, individuals may decide to pay 
the penalty as opposed to securing minimal coverage.136  Second, the 
penalty does not contain a scienter element.  In other words, the ACA is not 
attempting to punish bad behavior through the assessment of the penalty.137  
Finally, the penalty is paid to the IRS when payors submit their taxes, and 
the penalty is assessed in the same manner as taxes, namely through 
calculations based on taxable income, number of dependents per household, 
and joint filing status.138 
Roberts found that the individual mandate is a constitutional 
exercise of the taxing power because it does not create “any new federal 
power,” unlike allowing Congress to regulate inactivity under the 
Commerce Clause.139  In doing so, Roberts relied on Justice Holmes, citing 
the proposition that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by 
one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain 
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act,”140  Roberts noted “taxes that 
                                                 
 132. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591. 
 133. Id. at 2593 (“Just as the individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating 
the substantial effects of the failure to purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as 
a ‘necessary and proper’ component of the insurance reforms. The commerce power thus 
does not authorize the mandate.”). 
 134. Id. at 2598; see also id. at 2575 (noting that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan joined the opinion as to Parts I, II, and III-C and that Justice Ginsburg filed an 
opinion in respect to Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D concurring and dissenting in part, joined by 
Justice Sotomayor and Justices Breyer and Kagan in Parts I, II, III, and IV). 
 135. Id. at 2594–95. 
 136. Id. at 2594. 
 137. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 
 138. Id. at 2595–96. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 2599. 
 141. Id. at 2593 (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J. 
concurring opinion)). 
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seek to influence conduct are nothing new” and upheld the individual 
mandate as a valid exercise of the congressional power to tax and spend.141 
b) Chief Justice Roberts declined to find the Medicaid provision a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to tax and spend. 
Although the individual mandate was upheld under the power to tax 
and spend, the ACA’s Medicaid provision was not so fortunate.  The ACA 
expanded the Medicaid program by compelling states to increase the 
number of covered individuals.142  By 2014, the ACA required states to 
expand Medicaid to cover adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the 
federal poverty level.143  The ACA would increase a state’s federal funding 
to assist in covering the Medicaid expansion, but it also allowed the 
government to remove all of the state’s Medicaid funding should the state 
fail to adhere to the Medicaid provision.144 
Chief Justice Roberts examined the Medicaid provision under 
Congress’s power to tax and spend.  Although Congress has the power to 
influence state action through the Tax and Spend Clause, Roberts noted that 
states must not be coerced or forced into such behavior.145  He explained 
that states must have “a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal 
conditions in exchange for federal funds.”146  Roberts proposed a test for 
determining the constitutional scope of the tax and spend power which 
asked whether the financial inducement was “‘so coercive as to pass the 
point at which pressure turns into compulsion.’”147 
Roberts applied this test and found the Medicaid provision was not 
a simple financial inducement but was more akin to a “gun to the head.”148  
Roberts distinguished the Medicaid provision from the threatened budget 
cuts in South Dakota v. Dole.149  In Dole, the Court found a threat to 
withhold 5 percent of a state’s federal highway funds if it did not raise the 
drinking age to twenty-one was not coercive, because it would potentially 
affect less than half of 1 percent of the state’s overall budget.150  Roberts 
noted that the small percentage of affected funds gave South Dakota a real 
option in deciding whether or not to comply.151  In contrast, the Medicaid 
provision could potentially affect over twenty percent of a state’s overall 
                                                 
 142. Id. at 2596–98, 2601. 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. 
 146. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 147. Id. at 2602–03. 
 148. Id. at 2604 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2604–05. 
 151. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12. 
 152. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
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budget, and Roberts found the threat of losing such a large amount of 
funding removed any real choice from the states.152 
Roberts raised further issue with the Medicaid provision, finding 
that in practice it turned the existing Medicaid program into “a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.”153  He took issue with this concept because Congress cannot 
surprise the states with imposed conditions on preexisting programs or 
condition the grant of federal funds ambiguously.154  Even though the 
Medicaid program clearly allows the federal government to alter the 
program and the requirements for the disbursements of funds at any time, 
Roberts reasoned that such a drastic change as embodied in the ACA was 
beyond the scope of reasonable anticipation.155  Because the Medicaid 
expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely in degree,” Roberts 
agreed with the four conservative justices and struck down the provision as 
unconstitutional.156  However, Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with Justice 
Scalia that the Medicaid provision could not be severed and, thus, upheld 
the rest of the ACA.157 
Even though Roberts upheld the rest of the ACA, his determination 
that the Medicaid provision exceeded Congress’s powers to tax and spend 
instituted a limitation on congressional powers which had never before been 
imposed.158  He again tipped his hat to judicial restraint in upholding the 
                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2606. 
 155. Id. at 2605. 
 156. Id. at 2605–06. 
 157. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607, 2666. 
 158. Id. at 2607 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) includes a severability clause and thus 
interprets congressional intent to uphold the rest of the Act even though a portion of the Act 
might be struck down). 
 159. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting “for the first time ever—[the Court] 
finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive”) (emphasis in 
the original). 
  The scope of the power to tax and spend is set forth in Dole, in which the Court 
explained that any exercise of such power must be (1) for the general welfare of the people; 
(2) done so unambiguously so as to give the States notice of what they are agreeing to and 
allow them to make an intelligent and informed decision; (3) connected to the federal 
interest inherent to the federal program in question; and (4) must only induce state action 
that is itself constitutional. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). In Pennhurst 
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, the Court further examined the requirement that 
conditions be unambiguous and set limitations on the power to tax and spend. 451 U.S. 1 
(1981). In that case, residents of an institution for the mentally disabled complained that the 
state-run and federally-funded hospital did not adhere to the requirements of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, specifically the provisions of 
42 U.S.C. § 6010 which stated that treatment “should be provided in the setting that is least 
restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.” Id. at 13. The Court disagreed because it found 
that the provisions of § 6010 were not clearly mandatory upon the states and were not 
expressly set forth as requirements prior to the states’ acceptance of federal funds. Id. at 25. 
The Court held that the Act could not compel state action because it did not expressly 
include the provisions of § 6010 as conditional upon state compliance. Id. The section in 
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remaining ACA by noting the “‘touchstone for any decision about remedy 
is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of legislature.’”159  Yet, under the umbrella of judicial 
restraint, Chief Justice Roberts imposed novel limitations on congressional 
powers at every opportunity, placing brakes on both the Commerce Clause 
and Tax and Spend Clause for future applications. 
                                                                                                                 
question was easily differentiated from the other provisions of the Act, which set forth how 
funds should be allotted to the states and what the states must do in order to receive such 
funds. Id. at 13. The Court explained that “Congress must express clearly its intent to impose 
conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or 
not to accept those funds . . . The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State would 
knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can 
fairly say that the State could make an informed choice.” Id. at 24–25. 
  In Dole, the Court hinted at a fifth requirement, and one on which Justice Roberts 
relies heavily, namely that federal action must not be so coercive as to deprive a state of any 
real choice. Dole, 483 U.S. at 2798. However, as Justice Ginsburg explains in Sebelius, that 
requirement has not been the basis for subsequent limitations on the tax and spend clause. 
132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that prior to the Sebelius decision “the 
Court has never ruled that the terms of any grant crossed the indistinct line between 
temptation and coercion.”); see Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (1989) (finding that 
“[t]he coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, 
and never in favor of the challenging party” due to the rules elusiveness); Oklahoma v. 
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that “although there may be some 
limit to the terms Congress may impose, we have been unable to uncover any instance in 
which a court has invalidated a funding condition.”). 
  Therefore, it is curious why Justice Roberts, under the guise of judicial restraint, 
chose to place such a limitation when both Dole and Pennhurst, when read together, seem to 
provide a thorough explanation of the limitations on Congress’s power to tax and spend. 
That limitation is rooted in a lack of express, conditional terms made clear prior to the 
acceptance of federal funds. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25. Without the presence of such 
ambiguity, the Court is reticent to knock down an act of Congress. See Helvering v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (finding that a congressional decision will not be overturned 
“unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of 
judgment.”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (holding that the Court will only 
invalidate an act of Congress when there is a “showing that by no reasonable possibility can 
the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress. 
How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the general 
welfare of the United States, we need hardly remark.”). 
  In practice, the limitations on Congress’s power to tax and spend will only be 
found where, as in Pennhurst, a condition is not set out clearly and unambiguously as a 
requirement for federal funds “at the time the State receives and uses the money.” Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). As will be explained below, the Medicaid 
provision could easily pass under this bar because not only is the acceptance of Medicaid 
funds expressly conditioned on the acceptance that Congress can amend Medicaid at any 
time and in any way necessary to achieve its purpose, but the ACA itself clearly sets forth its 
requirements and conditions in a manner as to give the states several years to decide whether 
they will comply or decline to participate. See id. at 2637–38 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
 160. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 
46 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)). 
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IV. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DISGUISED AS 
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Although Chief Justice Roberts allegedly modeled the Sebelius 
decision on a philosophy of judicial restraint, an examination of both the 
individual mandate and Medicaid provision proves otherwise.  Both the 
individual mandate and Medicaid provision could have easily been upheld 
under the Commerce Clause and the power to tax and spend, respectively.  
Adopting a philosophy of judicial restraint, Roberts argued the Court 
should adhere to a “general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s 
elected leaders” and should only do so when Congress lacks clear 
constitutional authority to so act.160  This note argues true judicial restraint 
is impossible and, additionally, there are no clear, objective right and wrong 
answers in complicated issues of law and policy.  The Sebelius decision 
evidences the impossibility of true restraint because in every judgment there 
can be found some amount of activism and some modicum of subjectivity.  
As will be demonstrated below, the individual mandate and Medicaid 
provision can both be found constitutional under the government’s initial 
arguments, namely the Commerce Clause and the Tax and Spend Clause.  
Thus, a truly restrained opinion would find the individual mandate and 
Medicaid provision constitutional, all the while demonstrating a reticence to 
invalidate either provision or place novel limitations on legislative action.  
That reticence is absent in the Sebelius decision even though Roberts and 
various other scholars have promoted the opinion as one rooted in 
restraint.161  Such restraint, although much discussed, is rarely practiced, 
and the resulting opinion, influenced by Roberts’s position, policy and 
moral perspective, and political vantage point, evidences the inevitability of 
judicial activism. 
a) The Individual Mandate can be interpreted as a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause is 
limited, retrogressive, and unsupported by recent Commerce Clause 
precedent.162  A modern application of Commerce Clause precedent 
                                                 
 161. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (emphasis added). 
 162. See id. (Justice Roberts advocating and adopting a philosophy of restraint); see 
also Minow, supra note 19, at 118–19; Kane, supra note 19, at 56; DiMugno, supra note 19, 
at 1. 
 163. Although his opinion may be one correct interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
power, it is curious that Roberts would take such a bold step when Congress’s actions could 
so easily be interpreted as a normal application of modern Commerce Clause power; see 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that “[t]his rigid reading of 
the [Commerce] Clause makes scant sense and is stunningly retrogressive” and explaining 
that the Chief Justice’s “crabbed reading of the Commerce Clause harks back to the era in 
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demonstrates the individual mandate could be found constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause. In order to decipher the modern precedent defining 
the scope of the Commerce Clause, it is helpful to examine a brief history 
of its application. 
Modern Commerce Clause interpretation begins with an analysis of 
the Court’s decision in United States v. Darby, which overturned the 
limiting holding of Hammer v. Dagenhart.163  In Hammer, the Court found 
the Child Labor Law, which prohibited the sale of goods manufactured by 
children under the age of fourteen, was beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.164  The Court held the Commerce Clause is limited to the interstate 
transportation of goods, not their manufacture, and the “production of 
articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”165  
In 1941, the Court overturned this limited application of the Commerce 
Clause, and found that Congress had the power to regulate interstate and 
intrastate activity when it was “so related to commerce and so affects it as 
to be within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it.”166 
In 1942, the Court continued to expand the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.  In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court found the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, which penalized a farmer for growing wheat for personal 
use above the allotted quota, was within the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.167  The Court explained, “even if appellee’s activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce.”168  The Court went on to emphasize that the scope of 
congressional power is valid “irrespective of whether such effect is what 
might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”169 
As recently as 2005, the Court continued to give broad latitude to 
the Commerce Clause.  In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the 
Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) could regulate homegrown, localized 
marijuana, which had been legitimized through the Compassionate Care 
                                                                                                                 
which the Court routinely thwarted Congress’s efforts to regulate the national economy in 
the interest of those who labor to sustain it.”). 
 164. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 165. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918). 
 166. See id. (finding “[t]he making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce, 
nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped, or used in interstate 
commerce, make their production a part thereof”). 
 167. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115, 117 (finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act was a 
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause because “[w]hatever their motive and purpose, 
regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within 
the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.  Subject only to that 
limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the prohibition of the shipment 
interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.”). 
 168. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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Act.170  The Court emphasized that the scope of Commerce Clause 
applicability was based on the substantial relation of the act in question to 
interstate commerce.171  The Court clarified that Congress had never been 
required to prove a “scientific exactitude,” but rather must only prove that 
the “total incidence” of an act “poses a threat to the national market.”  
When such a substantial effect is established, Congress “may regulate the 
entire class.”172 
Although the Court reemphasized the broad scope of the 
Commerce Clause in Raich, it had taken historic steps several years earlier 
in both United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison to define the 
limitations of Congress’s commerce power.173  In Lopez, the Court set forth 
three categories of Commerce Clause power.  The first category involves 
the regulation of interstate economic activity; the second includes any 
instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate commerce, even if the 
actions in question resulted from only intrastate activity; and finally, the 
third category encapsulates the power to regulate any activities that have a 
“substantial relationship to interstate commerce.”174  However, the Court 
stated that the “substantially affects” criteria does not allow for piling 
“inference upon inference,” and the Commerce Clause power is limited to 
those subjects that directly link and directly affect commerce.175  In 
Morrison, the Court upheld this limitation, demanding a concrete economic 
                                                 
 171. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. The Court in Raich distinguished the CSA from both the legislative acts in Lopez 
and Morrison through its regulation of activity that was chiefly economical in nature. See id. 
at 25–26 (distinguishing the CSA by explaining that “[u]nlike those [Acts] at issue in Lopez 
and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic”).  In 
United States v. Lopez, the Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it 
a federal offense to possess a firearm within a school zone, was beyond the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power because it was regulating activity that did not “substantially 
affect interstate commerce” but was in fact a criminal statute and not an “essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity.” See 514 U.S. 549, 560–61 (1995).  In United States 
v. Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act because Congress’s 
provision of a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence did not substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 529 U.S. 598, 613–14 (2000). 
  These cases can be distinguished from Raich based on the “substantially affects” 
test employed in all three cases. See 545 U.S. at 25–26; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 560.  In Raich, the Court found that the regulation of marijuana growth and 
distribution substantially affected interstate commerce, whereas the legislative acts in Lopez 
and Morrison were not reasonably linked to economic activity. 545 U.S. at 38–39.  
However, the Court went even farther and explained that the scope of Congress’s commerce 
power is not only that activity which substantially affects interstate commerce, it is any 
activity, be it local and even noneconomic, so long as that regulation “is a necessary part of a 
more general regulation of interstate commerce . . . the relevant question is simply whether 
the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power.” Id. at 37 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). 
 175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 176. Id. at 567. 
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link to any regulated activity.176  The Court found such a link crucial to 
upholding federalism and the constitutional distinction between what is 
“truly national and what is truly local.”177 
However, even with these limitations, the Court has applied the 
“substantially affects” criteria broadly.178  The Court in Raich emphasized 
the scope of the commerce power when it held Congress could regulate any 
activity that “is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate 
commerce” as long as “the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”179  As Justice 
Ginsburg explained in her Sebelius concurrence, and as the preceding cases 
illustrate, there are two principles of Commerce Clause interpretation.  
First, Congress has the power to regulate any area that substantially affects 
interstate commerce, and second, the Court provides a great deal of 
deference and latitude to congressional action regulating economic and 
social activity.180  With these principles in mind, the individual mandate, 
which substantially affects the interstate healthcare market, could easily fall 
within the scope of Congress’s commerce power. In light of these 
principles, it is curious why Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the 
individual mandate was so stringent. Such an interpretation seems 
antithetical to principles of deference and restraint, regardless of a 
distinction between activity and inactivity. 
The majority in Sebelius spent a great deal of time discussing the 
distinction between activity and inactivity. They found Congress does not 
have the power to regulate economic inactivity or to propel consumers into 
the market.181  This holding is justified through the same automobile and 
vegetable analogy, namely that although an individual is likely to buy a 
new car or broccoli at some point in their life, the government does not 
have a right to mandate or regulate possible future purchases.182  The 
reliance on activity versus inactivity is flawed for several reasons. 
Primarily, the Court has never distinguished between activity and 
inactivity.  The Court, instead, has implied the opposite by affirming 
legislative regulation of future activity and the use of the Commerce Clause 
to propel individuals into the market.  In Wickard, the Court upheld the 
penalty because it found the legislature had a valid interest in protecting the 
wheat market and stimulating trade.183  It allowed the penalty for the 
primary purpose of discouraging private crop cultivation and propelling 
farmers into the wheat market.184  In Raich, the Court upheld congressional 
                                                 
 177. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 178. Id. at 617–18. 
 179. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79 (2012). 
 180. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 121). 
 181. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 2590–91 (majority opinion). 
 183. Id. at 2591. 
 184. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942). 
 185. Id. 
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action that regulated possible future activity. The Controlled Substance Act 
assumed local marijuana growers cultivating crops under California’s 
Compassionate Care Act would inevitably flood the interstate market and, 
thus, the government had the right to preemptively regulate and penalize 
such cultivation.185 
Further, the individual mandate relies upon action that is inevitable 
and involves a market in which practically every American is already 
engaged.  The healthcare market is vastly different from the automobile 
industry or vegetable marketplace.  As Justice Ginsburg explained, 
although most Americans purchase automobiles and broccoli within the 
course of their lives, such purchases are in no way absolute or inevitable.186  
Not all Americans drive, and there is surely a fair constituency of 
Americans who are averse to eating their vegetables.  But virtually all 
Americans get sick, and virtually all Americans need healthcare at some 
point in their lives.187 
Further, just because the Court has never expressly distinguished 
activity from inactivity does not mean Congress is precluded from pursuing 
legislation that regulates future activity.188  Chief Justice Roberts is 
concerned with the novelty of the individual mandate, but mere novelty of 
action has never discouraged the Court in the past.189  The Court is 
consistently asked to review new issues and interpret the scope of 
constitutional powers in novel contexts, and the Court has historically 
provided Congress the latitude to institute laws and regulations that are 
designed to meet the country’s current economic and social needs.190 
                                                 
 186. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 187. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2619–20 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 188. Id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (clarifying that “[u]nlike the market for 
almost any other product or service, the market for medical care is one in which all 
individuals inevitably participate. Virtually every person residing in the United States, 
sooner or later, will visit a doctor or other health-care professional.”). 
 189. Other Supreme Court Justices and federal courts have taken the opportunity to 
minimize the distinction between activity and inactivity already. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the “the 
irrelevance of the action-inaction distinction”); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 
1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting that “it is possible to restate most actions as 
corresponding inactions with the same effect.”). 
 190. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also 3 Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1123–1142 (1833) 
(explaining that just because Congress has yet to act in a certain manner “is clearly what 
lawyers call a non sequitur. It might with just as much propriety be urged, that, because 
congress had not hitherto used a particular means to execute any other given power, 
therefore it could not now do it.  If, for instance, congress had never provided a ship for the 
navy except by purchase, they could not now authorize ships to be built for a navy, or à 
converso. [ . . . ]. If they had never erected a custom-house, or court-house, they could not 
now do it. Such a mode of reasoning would be deemed by all persons wholly indefensible.”). 
 191. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reminding “[a]s our 
national economy grows and changes, we have recognized, Congress must adapt to the 
2015] THE GREAT TACTICIAN 175 
Chief Justice Roberts limited the application of the Commerce 
Clause due to fear of opening the floodgates of unchecked legislative 
power.191  However, this slippery slope analysis balks against precedent and 
does not provide a proper grounding for limiting the commerce power when 
Roberts simultaneously advocated for deference and restraint.  Roberts 
believed upholding the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause 
could lead to a “parade of horribles” that would allow Congress to mandate 
the purchase of anything from cars to broccoli.192  Yet, this analysis is 
directly opposed to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Just as the Court in Lopez 
explained the link to economic activity cannot be substantiated by piling 
“inference upon inference,”193 the same rule applies in reverse.  The Court 
should not pile inference upon inference to imagine the worst-case scenario 
of legislative action.194  When addressing the scope of Congress’s spending 
power, the Court in Butler explained that: 
A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be 
justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless 
congressional spending which might occur if courts could 
not prevent expenditures which, even if they could be 
thought to [a]ffect any national purpose, would be possible 
only by action of a legislature lost to all sense of public 
responsibility.195 
The Court’s analysis in Butler can easily be applied to the 
Commerce Clause.  Not only could the same “parade of horribles” be used 
in reverse (if Congress cannot issue an individual mandate to compel 
activity, what happens in the case of an outbreak of a deadly virus that will 
only be combated by a certain antibody?), such analysis goes against a 
basic tenet of the Commerce Clause power—to defer to Congress on issues 
of economic and social policy.196  Not only should the Court endeavor to 
                                                                                                                 
changing ‘economic and financial realities.’”) (citing N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 
(1946)). 
 192. Id. at 2588–90 (majority opinion). 
 193. Id. at 2591 (2012). 
 194. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 195. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67, 87 (1936). 
 196. Id. 
 198. See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1825, 1829, 1868 (2011) (noting that slippery slope analysis is detrimental and 
works against the deference owed to Congress, especially in regards to federal measures 
such as compulsory healthcare that “might, someday soon, be desperately needed”).  Not 
only is the slippery slope analysis unhelpful in determining the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate, it evidences the overall thesis that judicial determinations are not and 
cannot be purely restrained and objective, but instead are a product of myriad subjective 
influences and factors.  Roberts’s use of the “parade of horribles” illustrates the other 
influences that contributed to his decision, such as public policy and political and ethical 
concerns.  Roberts’s fear that compulsory healthcare will create a slippery slope into 
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support the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislative 
branches, as Roberts himself pointed out, it is beyond the scope of the 
Court’s power and responsibility to weigh in on the wisdom and prudence 
of legislative action.197  Justice Ginsburg most recently reaffirmed this 
principle in stating; “we owe a large measure of respect to Congress when it 
frames and enacts economic and social legislation.”198  Justice Clarence 
Thomas reminded the Court that “[i]n areas of social and economic policy, 
[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
process, and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter 
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’”199  Justice 
Stevens adopted Justice Thurgood Marshall’s oft repeated mantra that 
“[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid 
laws.”200 
                                                                                                                 
unbridled commerce power is illustrative of the influences Justice Holmes identified as part 
and parcel of judicial decision making. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64 (noting that Holmes 
identified several factors that influence the judiciary, all reaching beyond objective logic, 
and including “the felt necessity of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed”).  Roberts’s concern that compulsory healthcare can turn 
into compulsory produce purchases is rooted in his own public policy concerns and the 
prevalent political and moral concerns a Supreme Court Justice must inevitably consider. 
See Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296 (identifying this practice 
of interpretation as judges not only finding law but creating it and arguing that such creation 
is inevitable. He explains that judges “create with given materials which come to them [ . . . ] 
which strain and ‘feel’ in one direction rather than another and with one color and tone 
rather than another,” and these subjective materials reveal “the misconception that things get 
done by rules of law ‘and not men.’”).  Roberts’s policy concerns are made of the stuff of his 
subjective experience, and such a “parade of horribles” could just as easily be dismissed or 
applied in reverse. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2619–20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (dismissing 
Roberts’s fear that compulsory healthcare can bleed into other markets such as the 
automobile and agriculture industries as inapplicable to other markets due to the “inevitable 
yet unpredictable need for medical care”); Hall, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 1829 (identifying a parade of horribles that could come pass without compulsory 
healthcare) (emphasis added). 
 199. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (Roberts clarifying that it is not the Court’s job to 
“protect people from the consequences of their political choices”). 
 200. Id. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 201. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993) (quoting Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). 
 203. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).  The Court adopts a “presumption of constitutionality” for 
“regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions” and the Court is reticent 
to question the legislature’s judgment and reasoning. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). However, as clarified in Carolene, that presumption may not 
apply to legislative action that is unconstitutional on its face or infringes on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, especially pertaining to “discrete and insular minorities.” Id. at n.4. When 
confronted with legislative action of this nature the Court applies a stricter standard of 
review. Id. 
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The individual mandate can find solace in the two principles of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as identified by Justice Ginsburg.201  First, 
the mandate is substantially related to interstate commerce.202  Indeed, the 
individual mandate is likely necessary to regulate and create equilibrium in 
the healthcare market.  “The large number of individuals without health 
insurance, Congress found, heavily burdens the national health-care 
market,”203 and the mandate serves to address an economic and social 
problem that is at a breaking point for millions of Americans.  Over fifty 
million people are uninsured and unable to secure the necessary care they 
need due to the high expense of insurance.204  Further, due to the 
uninsured’s inability to secure consistent primary care, they are funneled 
into emergency rooms of hospitals across the country, which are prohibited 
from refusing care.205  The use of emergency care for non-emergency 
purposes, especially by those that are unlikely to have the means to pay the 
ensuing high medical bills, pushes the cost of healthcare up to unwieldy 
levels for those Americans that can afford health insurance.206  Congress 
recognized this dire social and economic issue and issued the individual 
mandate as part of the cure. 
Second, the Court is typically highly deferential to congressional 
regulation of economic activity,207 and in Sebelius, the Court could have 
adhered to precedent and granted Congress latitude in its promulgation of 
the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.  Because the 
individual mandate is directly and substantially related to interstate 
commerce and does not violate the traditional scope of the Commerce 
Clause, the Court could easily have practiced judicial restraint and deferred 
to Congress in addressing this economic and social crisis.208 
As discussed above, legal realism argues there is not a clear, 
objective, singular answer to any complicated rule of constitutional law.209  
The philosophy of judicial restraint advocates for an objective and 
deferential judicial perspective in order to minimize the personal influences 
on the judiciary with the hope that such deference will afford predictability 
                                                 
 204. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(A) (2006) (“The requirement regulates activity that is 
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when 
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”). 
 206. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 207. See Carmen DeNavas–Walt, et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
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and narrow the number of interpretations that can result from a legal 
question.210  This note argues that true restraint is a fiction because every 
judgment is inevitably a product of the judge.211  This principle is illustrated 
by Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the individual mandate.  The point is 
not that Justice Roberts was wrong, but that a decision in the opposite 
would have been just as right.  Therefore, if finding the individual mandate 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause would have been another right 
answer, Justice Roberts’s opinion was not a product of restraint but of 
activism. It is a product of the myriad of subjective influences that naturally 
surround the judicial process. 
b) The Medicaid provision can be interpreted as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to tax and spend. 
Chief Justice Roberts took an unprecedented step in striking down 
the ACA’s Medicaid clause, “for the first time ever find[ing] an exercise of 
Congress’s spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”212  Roberts took 
strides to distinguish Sebelius from South Dakota v. Dole, by adhering to 
the rule set forth in Dole which defined the scope of the spending power, 
but found the Medicaid provision went a step too far. Roberts found the 
Medicaid provision represented a virtual “gun to the head” because of the 
large percentage of funds that states’ could lose if they did not accept the 
program.213  Roberts noted the financial inducement in Dole was only 5 
percent of highway funds, whereas, Medicaid spending amounts to as much 
as twenty percent of a state’s budget.214  Despite the fact Medicaid funds are 
tendered upon the express stipulation the program can be adjusted and 
changed at Congress’s will, the majority found such a threat overly coercive 
and ambiguous.215  Roberts found the Medicaid provision ambiguous 
because it was, in effect, not a change in degree but a “shift in kind,” 
thereby creating an entirely new program.216 
Although the majority determined the Medicaid provision to be 
unduly coercive, another interpretation is just as plausible.  Under Dole, the 
Court set forth the scope of the spending power.  Any actions taken under 
the grant of Congress’s spending power must be “in pursuit of the general 
welfare” of the nation, unambiguous, not overly coercive, and related to a 
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federal interest.217  Further, the judiciary should provide great deference to 
legislative action.218 
It is clear and undisputed throughout the Sebelius decision that the 
Medicaid provision was created in pursuit of the general welfare of the 
nation to cure the current health care crisis in the United States.219  The real 
question becomes whether the provision is indeed overly coercive and 
ambiguous. When considering these questions, in spite of the deference 
owed to Congress, Roberts found the answer to be “yes.”220  However, it is 
just as plausible to answer with a resounding “no.” 
The argument that the Medicaid provision is unduly coercive and 
ambiguous is open to attack when compared with the Social Security Act 
itself.  The Act expressly reserves to Congress “[t]he right to alter, amend, 
or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid program.221  This reservation is 
not tempered by a restriction of any kind.222  It is unambiguous in that it 
gives Congress the absolute right to alter and amend the program as it sees 
fit. 
Not only is Congress’s right to alter and amend the Medicaid 
provision clear and unequivocal, Congress’s ability to use its Tax and 
Spend power to induce behavior is well founded.  Not only did Roberts 
reinforce this principle himself,223 but the Court has long upheld such a 
right. In Butler, the Court assured that “the power to tax and spend includes 
the power to relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by conditional 
gifts of money.”224 
However, even though Butler allowed the Tax and Spend power to 
be used to induce behavior, such actions must still be done unambiguously 
and in a manner that allows states to accept such conditions “voluntarily 
and knowingly.”225  Under the Medicaid provision, the states are aware 
Congress has to the right to alter and amend the program at any time, the 
requirements are clear and unambiguous, and the states may choose or 
decline to implement the program.226  It is arguable that because Congress 
has the right to repeal Medicaid entirely, it surely has the right to amend its 
provisions and condition its funds however it sees fit, especially when done 
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in pursuit of the national welfare and to address a national economic 
crisis.227 
It is difficult to reconcile Roberts’s holding with his promotion of 
judicial restraint when Congress has long maintained right to repeal and 
amend Medicaid per 42 U.S.C. § 1304.  Not only does Congress clearly 
have such right, but the Medicaid provision satisfies Dole, in that it was 
created to benefit the national welfare and the requirements are set forth 
unambiguously.228  When discussing the individual mandate, Roberts 
reminded the Court that “‘every reasonable construction must be resorted 
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’”229  However, despite 
promoting a position of restraint, Roberts struck down the Medicaid 
provision in its entirety, and for the first time, the Court found that 
Congress’s action under the spending power was overly coercive.230  This 
holding not only goes against long held Supreme Court spending power 
precedent, it denies the deference typically owed to Congress.  In Butler, 
the Court emphasized the importance of the separation of powers and the 
restraint that should be imposed on the judiciary.  Justice Stone explained 
that while the Executive and Legislative powers are checked by judicial 
review, “the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense 
of self-restraint.  For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books 
appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of 
democratic government.”231 
Again, the question is not whether Roberts’s interpretation is 
wrong, it is whether the opposite view could be just as right.  Similar to the 
possible interpretations of the individual mandate, the Medicaid provision 
could have been upheld as constitutional under Congress’s power to tax and 
spend.  Roberts’s holding is again illustrative of the lack of judicial restraint 
actually applied in Sebelius and evidences Roberts’s judicial activism.  A 
truly restrained position would apply any and “every reasonable 
construction . . . in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”232  Yet 
Roberts declined to accept the reasonable constructions set forth by the 
government, evidencing not restraint but an opinion influenced by 
subjective factors.  Why Roberts practiced judicial activism disguised as 
restraint is discussed below. 
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V. WHY ROBERTS ADOPTED JUDICIAL RESTRAINT BUT PRACTICED 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED HIS 
DECISION 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is touted as an exemplary act of 
judicial restraint.233  Scholars seem to have based that opinion almost 
completely on the fact that Roberts said he was going to employ judicial 
restraint234 and because he decided against members of his own party.235  
Yet such an interpretation is superficial and short-sighted.  Roberts’s 
Sebelius decision was not an exercise of judicial restraint, but was, in fact, 
judicial activism, as demonstrated by his interpretation and application of 
the Commerce Clause and Tax and Spend Clause.  True deference and 
restraint would have upheld both the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause and the Medicaid provision as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to tax and spend. Yet Roberts found otherwise, and that 
decision was based on a myriad of factors.  Such influences are not meant 
to cast a shadow on Roberts or shine a spotlight on a weakness of judicial 
impartiality.  They are meant only to show true judicial restraint is an 
impossibility, and any judicial decision is inevitably a creation of the judge 
and, thus, influenced by her own subjective experience.236 
Although this note argues Roberts did not actually practice judicial 
restraint in the Sebelius decision, it does not say that Roberts does not value 
judicial restraint and espouse it as the backbone of his judicial philosophy.  
Nor is the argument as to the fictionality of judicial restraint meant to 
negate the fact that Roberts, like so many Supreme Court Justices before 
him, attempted in good faith to submit a restrained opinion.  The only 
argument is this: judicial restraint is a fiction.  Whether it is a detrimental or 
necessary fiction is yet to be seen. 
Roberts’s belief in judicial restraint is evident throughout his career 
and his tenure on the Supreme Court. Roberts advocated for “judicial 
humility” during his 2005 confirmation hearings237 and continued to 
promote such a philosophy throughout his opinions.238  Yet in the Sebelius, 
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despite an adoption of judicial restraint, Roberts, especially due to his 
position of Chief Justice, was influenced by factors such politics, 
reputation, and legacy. 
Chief Justice Roberts, like all Chief Justices before him, has much 
to consider beyond the multitude of briefs, oral arguments, and opinions 
that will flow through the Court during his tenure. In an interview with 
Jeffrey Rosen in 2007, Chief Justice Roberts discussed the characteristics of 
the judiciary most important to him, and chief among those is the concern 
to achieve bipartisanship and create a cohesive court.  Roberts explained 
that “every justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and 
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re writing 
separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.”239  He further 
affirmed “[i]t’s a high priority to keep any kind of partisan divide out of the 
judiciary as well.”240  With these goals in mind, Roberts explained his role 
as Chief Justice is to help create a unified Court, and to do so he could and 
would reward those Justices who wrote opinions that were able to attract 
more votes and lessen the number of dissenting and concurring opinions.241 
These goals and intentions are indeed lofty and worthwhile, but in 
their very espousal demonstrate the other factors at play in the creation of 
judiciary opinions.  Roberts’s Sebelius decision shows the effects of these 
factors.  As Eric Schepard explains, “Chief Justice Roberts likely 
recognized that striking down another major act of Congress along partisan 
lines would severely threaten his Court’s legitimacy.”242 
Roberts’s decision regarding the individual mandate further shows 
the influence of political philosophies and pressures.  Although upholding 
the individual mandate at first resembles a win for the Obama 
Administration, the opinion in full actually takes significant strides to limit 
congressional power in ways unprecedented.  It would be insulting to infer 
that such political gains were unintentional.  The Chief Justice crafted an 
opinion that allowed him to successfully walk the tight rope between 
partisanship, the need to create a unified court, and the desire to institute the 
type of constitutional limitations he felt were necessary. 
There is no reason to assume that such influences and factors are 
unworthy of the Chief Justice’s position. In fact, they infuse the core of his 
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station.  As Roberts identified, a Chief Justice must concern himself with 
more than just the cases before the Court, but also with securing the 
sanctity, reputation, and reliability of the Court, as well as insuring the 
Court not only upholds law and the Constitution but also the separation of 
powers so vital to the fabric of the nation.243  The only question is why the 
judiciary cannot and does not call a spade a spade.  At every turn, the Chief 
Justice defended the majority opinion through a lens of judicial restraint, 
when in fact there were very real political and ideological issues on the line, 
and the Chief Justice took full opportunity to settle those accounts. 244  Such 
an opinion is not an exercise of judicial restraint, it is judicial activism. 
CONCLUSION 
Through an examination of the Sebelius decision, Justice Holmes’s 
proclamation that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience” rings true.  Chief Justice Roberts was not wrong, he did not 
misapply the law, and he did not abuse or subvert his position.  His opinion 
is balanced, constitutional, creative, and curative.  But it is not judicial 
restraint, and just as he is not wrong in his analysis, neither is he 
definitively right.  His opinion is influenced by his experience and his 
perspective.  As Karl Llewellyn espoused, there is no one correct answer.245  
There are many correct answers.  A true exercise of restraint would have 
shown proper deference to Congress and only found components of the 
ACA unconstitutional if the Act explicitly went beyond the legislature’s 
enumerated powers.  Yet, the ACA does not on its face fall outside of 
Congress’s constitutional grant of power.  As seen above, both the 
individual mandate and Medicaid provision can be interpreted to fall well 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause and the power to tax and spend, 
respectively.  Due to the fact that the ACA could just as easily be 
interpreted through Justice Ginsburg’s perspective as it could Justice 
Roberts’s, there must be other factors at play.  These factors manifest the 
inevitability of judicial activism and the impossibility of judicial restraint. 
Judicial restraint is a fiction.  Karl Llewellyn explained “[w]hat is 
inherent is that the man must always enter into the result: it is he who must 
read the words of the rule of law, it is he who must size up the facts as to 
whether a rule of law applies.  No rule of law ever applied itself.”246  The 
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only question is whether judicial restraint is a necessary or detrimental 
fiction. 
On one hand, judicial restraint can serve as a check on the 
judiciary.  By proclaiming the necessity and value of judicial restraint, the 
judiciary is reminded it is beyond its scope to evaluate the wisdom of law, 
and, instead, must only interpret the law.247  Such a check on judicial 
powers is especially important when considering the entire allotment of 
powers distributed among the branches.  The judiciary checks the executive 
and legislative branches along with the power of the people to cast their 
vote.  Yet, who checks the unelected judiciary?  Without some self-imposed 
restraint, is the whole system threatened? 
On the other hand, continuing under a façade of judicial restraint 
may work to reinforce a partisan system and leave all three branches 
forever awash in the backwater of polarized, two-party political ideology.  
Karl Llewellyn explains that “the court uses a conventional vocabulary that 
continues to unfortunately presuppose there is only one correct answer and 
so then there are two opposing canons on every part.”248  This dichotomy of 
correctness is unhealthy and moves the debate away from crucial issues, 
such as healthcare reform, to never-ending battles of political puffery. 
The United States is indeed in the middle of a healthcare crisis.  
Millions of lower income Americans are without health insurance and 
millions who are sick go without care.  Mothers, fathers, sons, and 
daughters die of illnesses that could be treated, all because of money and a 
lack thereof.  In light of such a crucial issue, did Chief Justice Roberts’s 
promotion of judicial restraint serve the Court in its analysis, or would a bit 
of realism and recognition of judicial activism have served the Court better?  
To argue that reality is always preferable is persuasive.  A forthright Court 
which acknowledges the inevitability of subjectivity may very well take a 
step closer to bipartisanship and empower justices to address a national 
crisis without overstepping their allotted constitutional powers.  It is further 
arguable, in regards to the ACA and the restraint so promoted by Chief 
Justice Roberts, that the will of the legislature (and thus the people) should 
have been upheld in full.  However, whether judicial restraint is a necessary 
fiction sustaining federalism and the separation of powers or a detrimental 
façade keeping the country locked in two-party conflict is a question that 
only time will tell. 
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